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Abstract—Software-Defined Networking (SDN) or Virtual Net-
works (VNs) are required for cloud tenants to leverage demands.
However, multi-tenancy can be compromised without proper
isolation. Much research has been conducted into VN Isolation;
many researchers are not tackling security aspects or checking if
their isolation evaluation is complete. Therefore, data leakage is
a major security worry in the cloud in general. This paper uses
an OpenStack VN and OpenStack Tenant Network to test multi-
tenancy features. We aim to evaluate the relationship between
isolation methods used in cloud VN and the amount of data
being leaked through using penetration tests. These tests will be
used to identify the vulnerabilities causing cloud VN data leakage
and to investigate how the vulnerabilities, and the leaked data,
can compromise the tenant Virtual Networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Virtual Networks (VNs) are one of the current hot re-
search topics. VNs helped establish the new concept of the
Future Internet [1]. However, new projects and technologies
demonstrated the potential benefits of using VNs in Cloud
Computing, e.g: Cloud Networking, NaaS, CloudNaas, Open-
Stack Quantum/Neutron [2]–[4]. This research will utilize
OpenStack Neutron to implement the tenants Virtual Network.
Isolation is a main requirement to guarantee privacy and
safety of tenant’s data as well as providing independence of
services or data traffic. However, without proper isolation, the
network scalability and performance is compromised [5] [6].
According to the Cloud Security Alliance [7], medium-to-large
enterprises flagged that top vulnerabilities were caused by un-
suitable data and network isolation. Additionally, researchers
[6] clarified that tenants may attack other tenants by DOS or
resource consuming if proper isolation has not been used in a
VN.
Data leakage is one of the major worries in the cloud due
to the multi-tenancy feature [8]. In [9], the authors listed two
common concerns arising from a cloud customer survey made
by Fujitsu. The two major concerns were: were the information
appropriately isolated and what if the cloud operation would
lead to data leakage or corruption? This research aims to
clarify these concerns, focusing on how appropriately a VN
is isolated and if the isolation methods used cause the data
leakage. However, the data of concern here are those that
could be used to create vulnerabilities in cloud VN Isolation
functionality such as in discovering the flow rules or the
forwarding policies of the network.
The aims of this research are to detect the VN isolation
methods used in OpenStack and to identify the vulnerabilities
causing data leakage in a tenant network through penetration
testing. An evaluation of the relationship between the amount
and quality of VN related data leakage and the VN isolation
methods are underway.
In this paper we use certain terminologies to represent
specific meaning in this research. The first term is components
and is used to refer to ports, virtual switches -Open vSwitch
(OVS) or Linux switches-, namespaces, etc. The second term
is mechanisms and it implies the use of the combination of
components to form the network structure and connections.
And finally, the term method indicates the process of how the
network isolation is done.
This paper will outline the related work of VN isolation in
Section 2, followed by the methodology, the testbed and the
implementation status of this research. The expected re- sults
are outlined and finally, Section 3 will be the conclusion and
the future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Isolation mechanisms and technology by itself carry several
challenges needing be solved such as: isolation expressing
and verification, network configuration, isolation provision and
guaranteeing, performance, scalability and other engi- neering
factors [10] [11] [5].
Nevertheless, isolation related security hasn’t received
proper attention in the research community, although several
authors have raised their concerns, for example [12] stated
that the multi-tenancy feature in virtualization compromises
the client confidentiality without a certain degree of isolation.
Many researchers have investigated VN Isolation using
different methods such as: VLAN, GRE [13], EtherIP [14],
Flowvisor [15], OVX [16] and OpenFlow [17], etc. The aim
of their researches was to define the VN Isolation mechanisms
that was adopted in their case studies, or into their proposed
projects as VN Isolation solutions. For instance, the Splendid
Isolation project [11] was built to solve the VN configuration
issues through Isolation.
However, none of those researchers tackled the security of
VN Isolation as its main goal. Therefore, our research selects
some of the above Isolation methods, those that are applicable
Fig. 1. Three-Nodes OpenStack Cloud Architecture.
to be implemented in OpenStack Neutron, and investigates
their vulnerabilities under a controlled experiment.
The Survey of Security in SDNs [18] provided clear security
issues related to VNs and openly stated that the least re-
searched security aspect in the field were data leakage and data
modification. Consequently, this research contribution will be
restricted to enhancing the cloud VN Isolation against data
leakage.
The following articles stated theories of the relationship be-
tween isolation and data leakage, where the research intended
to prove or disprove the theories via empirical work:
1 [18] Conveyed an assumption that if a VN (called log-
ical network here) and their identification/authorization
information of a each tenant is securely isolated, then
the data that could be used to compromise the network
functionality should not be leaked.
2 [19] Stated that unsuccessful resource isolation be-
tween the tenants in the cloud may result in a prospective
harmful security effect and mentioned side-channel data
leakage as one of the security attacks.
3 [20] Declared that operating isolated networks sliced
alongside each other, leaking network data from one slice
to another should not be achievable.
4 [21] Acknowledged that to guarantee no data leakage
between virtual instances in a cloud environment, a well-
defined isolation of data and processes is a must.
III. EMPIRICAL WORK
A. Testbed
The main emphasis of this research is one part of
Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS). The OpenStack Cloud en-
vironment was selected as a testbed based on the compar-
ison study made by [4]. Moreover, OpenStack contains a
module called Neutron, previously called Quantum, which was
specifically built for Virtual Networking Services in the cloud
[22]. Finally, the [4] comparison encouraged administrators
and researchers to deploy OpenStack especially if the intention
was to use the existing resources or to use the stack system
for experimentation.
The testbed was implemented based on a multi-node ar-
chitecture with OpenStack Networking (Neutron) using the
OpenStack installation guide for Ubuntu 14.04 Kilo [23]. The
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testbed shown in Figure 1 consists of three nodes: Controller
Node, Compute Node and Network Node. How- ever, the
Network and Compute nodes (see Figures 3 & 4) are the focal
points in this research as all the VN Isolation components and
methods are implemented in both. This will be explained in
the next sections.
B. Implementation Status
Figure 2 shows the core of this research, which is to
investigate the cloud VN Isolation mechanisms for security.
The diagram shows the three main topics of the research:
cloud VN, isolation mechanisms and security. The cloud VN
represents the experimental testbed, where OpenStack was
used as the cloud environment with Neutron to provide the
VN implementation (Network as a Service).
In the testbed a scenario of two tenants (intra-tenants) was
implemented. Using white box testing to uncover the cloud
underlying network structure, it was discovered that Open-
Stack/Neutron uses four isolation mechanisms/components:
VLAN, GRE, OpenFlow (OVS switches) and Linux Network
Namespaces.
1) Penetration Tests:: the scope of penetration testing is
to focus on exploiting the vulnerability of cloud VN infras-
tructure, specifically the isolation mechanisms and how secure
they are against the data leakage. Two types of penetration test
are planned: Network Penetration Test (NIST) and Web Ap-
plication Penetration Test (OWASP) [24]. OpenStack allows
tenants to access their cloud instance in two ways, one way
through SSH using the instance floating IP address (Public IP
address) and, separately, through a web API called Horizon.
Hence, the plan was to use two penetration test methodologies:
NIST and OWASP . The Plan and Discover phases of NIST
have already been completed. In the Discover phase of NIST, a
white box test was applied by executing several scripts written
with shell and OpenStack commands. The scripts executed in
the three nodes and collected all possible information about the
network structure, components, configuration and databases
information. The output of the scripts was used to sketch
the internal network components and connections as shown
in Figures 3 & 4.
The next two phases of NIST will be the Attack and the
Report phases. In the Attack phase we will reuse information
from the Discover phase, as it is needed. Moreover, in the
Attack Phase we will decide if a component is to be tested
and monitored. We currently consider using Wireshark for this
phase, but at this stage we can only decide what to monitor
or how to test the data leakage after defining the data leakage
requirement and parameters.
More penetration testing will be conducted via OWASPs
methodology, as this testing is specific for web application
testing, as tenants access their cloud assets using the Open-
Stack Horizon API. In this case, black box testing will be the
approach used with the assumption that the tenant wishes to
gain extra information of the underlying system with the their
current privileges through the web API.
2) Data Collection and Analysis:: Once we successfully
collect all the data and identify the risk assessments variables,
we can then find the appropriate evaluation metrics that will
reflect the number and the type of data leakage. In order to
produce the statistical analysis, we will use the R statistical
package.
3) Cloud Virtual Network Components and Connection::
as mentioned above, the diagrams of the internal network
components of the Compute and Network nodes were drawn
(see Figure 3 & 4) after running the scripts and analysing
the data collected. Figures 3 & 4 show how the underlying
structure of the tenant VN is concentrated in the Compute
and Network node.
In Figure 3 the Compute node connects each tenants in-
stance to a unique Linux vSwitch (qb) with a collection of
virtual ports (tap & qvb), however, all tenant instances share
the same OVS switch (br-int) with each instances qvb port
paired with qvo in an internal bridge, br-int, switch. However,
all qvo belong to a tenant grouped under the same VLAN tag,
while other tenant qvb ports have their own tenant VLAN tag.
As is noted from Figure 3 the ports (tap, qb, qvb & qvo)
identified with the same number are automatically generated
by OpenStack to represent the connection path of one instance.
Moreover, the traffic will be forwarded to the network node
through the br-tun bridge where all tenants share the bridge
and GRE port. On the other hand - as Figure 4 demonstrates-
the Network node receives the traffic from Compute node
through the tunnel switch to the GRE port in the br-tun
bridge before transfering the traffic to the br-int bridge. In
this scenario, we created one private network and one internal
router for each tenant. OpenStack (see Figure 4) created two
network namespaces for each tenant, qdhcp representing the
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DHCP server for the tenants private network and qrouter
representing the tenants internal router. The bridge br-int
consist of two types of ports; each tap port is related to
a specific tenant qdhcp namespace, while the qr port is
connected to the tenants internal router and is considered to be
the tenants private network gateway. Both tap & qr ports are
labeled with a specific tenant VLAN. Moreover, the qg port is
another port that is connected to the tenant router namespace
and is the connection to the external network, configured with
floating IP Addresses (public IP addresses for each tenant
instance). This physically exists in the br-ex OVS bridge. The
qrouter namespace perform NAT through the iptables within
the namespace to allow tenants to connect to their instance
remotely using the floating IP addresses.
C. Expected Results
If the virtual network is not securely isolated, a data leakage
most likely will occur and this defies the main security
requirement of VNs. Our analysis will tackle two categories
and they are: the amount of data leaked (quantity), and the
type of data leaked (quality).
Once the data leakage concept has been precisely defined,
the testing will lead us to define the criteria for effective
isolation methods. To illustrate, if our testing parameters focus
on the number of packages leaked per isolation mechanism
for each test case, then we can calculate the mean, standard
deviation or percentage, and this will indicate the most or least
mechanism leaking data. On the other hand, if we categorized
the data leaked from each method into types, flow data or
forwarding policy data, and distinguish the importance of
each, then we will have a reference of which is the most
dangerous mechanism to be leaking data used to compromise
VN functionality.
We may obtain some statistical analysis from Wireshark,
although we are planning to use it for testing and monitoring.
After collecting the data in the VN Isolation scenarios, before
and after an attack, we will compare the amount of leakage
exposed. The outcome data will be analyzed via R.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Cloud providers attempt to fulfill a clients requirements
by providing more advanced demands in regards to the per-
formance, scalability and traffic isolation. VNs share multi-
tenancy features with the cloud and these are successfully
satisfied with proper isolation mechanisms. Although security
is one of the aims of introducing VNs to the cloud, and
despite the fact that VN isolation mechanisms have research
attention in the industrial and academic fields in term of
the performance, scalability and deployment, the area lacks
empirical security research.
This paper outlines an investigation into VN isolation mech-
anisms used in a cloud and exploits their security vulnerabil-
ities in relation to network data leakage.
The research uses OpenStack as a testbed to investigate a
virtual network created and managed by the neutron module.
Due to the structure of OpenStack in giving the tenant access
their instance either through the network using SSH or through
the browser using Horizon web application, two types of
penetration tests have been selected for trials. They follow
the NIST and OWASP test methodologies.
Currently, two stages (Plan and Discovery) of the NIST
method have been completed through white box testing con-
ducted to reveal the internal cloud network structure and
expose the isolation mechanisms OpenStack network infras-
tructure relies on.
The next step will be the attack phase on OpenStack
network isolation mechanisms and components to discover any
incident of data leakages and the type of data been leaked.
A similar scenario will be adopted to perform the OWASP
test on the OpenStack Horizon API and collect any network
related data and the type of data collected.
Finally, with statistical analyses of the collected data, a
conclusion will be drawn of which VN isolation mechanism
and components allow us to compromise the OpenStack Cloud
Virtual Network.
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